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Trade liberalization and wage distribution when skilled intermediate input is used in import 
competing sector that uses a commom type of capital 
 
Abstract 
 
The presence of informal sector is a pervasive and persistent feature of most developing 
countries of the world. The phenomenon related to informal labor markets has become a great 
concern for our policy makers. This paper presents a simple theoretical model of a small open 
economy comprising of three formal and a single informal sector. Labour is the common 
factor of production which is segregated as skilled and unskilled ones. In accordance with the 
traditional specification it is assumed that skilled labours are used in the formal and informal 
labours are used in the informal sector. The distinguishing feature of the present paper is that 
the import competing formal sector uses both skilled and unskilled labours. Moreover, these 
two types of labour work in separate sectors using a common type of capital under the same 
economic structure. In such backdrop we tried to study the impact of trade liberalization on 
absolute and relative wage(s). It has been found that irrespective of factor intensity ranking 
both types of workers gain owing to tariff cut whereas under reasonable condition wage 
disparity between the two types of labour is reduced.  
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I. Introduction 
A Balance of Payments crisis in 1991 pushed India to near bankruptcy. The Indian rupee 
devalued and economic reforms wear forced upon India. Trade reform allowed domestic 
providers of goods and service to compete freely in world markets and foreign providers to 
compete more freely in domestic market. Policies that make an economy open to trade and 
investment with the rest of the world are needed for sustained economic growth. Integration 
with the world economy has been proven to be a powerful means for countries to promote 
economic growth, development and poverty reduction. There is considerable evidence that 
more outward oriented countries tend consistently to grow faster than those countries that are 
inward looking (Bhagwati 1986; Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 1997; Frankel and Romer 1999). 
The primary goal of economic liberalization is the free flow of capital between nations and 
efficient allocation of resources. This is usually done by reducing protectionist policies such 
as tariffs, trade laws and other trade barriers commonly termed as ‘Liberalization policies’. 
Thus, liberalization policy has exposed the entire domestic sector to the throat cutting 
competition of free market.  
The informal sector is no exception. In spite of the fact that there are some definitional 
differences across developed and developing countries, the existence of such sector is 
undeniable. However, the informal sector1 is huge and largely undocumented in most 
developing economies. It provides the means of livelihood to millions of people around the 
world, particularly in the developing countries. A substantial proportion of employment and 
output generation are concentrated in the informal sector (Schneider et al., 2010). According 
to the statistics compiled by WIEGO, informal employment as per cent of total Non- 
agricultural Employment over 2004-2010 is about 82% in South Asia, 66% in sub- Saharan 
                                                            
1 The First Indian Commission on Labor (1966-69) defined  unorganized sector workforce as- “Those workers 
who have not been able to organize themselves in pursuit of their common interest due to certain constraints 
like casual nature of employment, ignorance and illiteracy, small and scattered size of establishments”. 
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Africa, 65% in East and Southeast Asia, 51% in Latin America, 45% in Middle East and 
North Africa and 10% in Eastern Europe and Central Asia ( Statistical report, WIEGO. 
2010). The share of persons employed in the informal economy is 68.8% in case of India. 
Informal workers are absorbed by different sectors of the economy. In case of transportation 
it is 84.5%, for construction sector 97.6%, 97.2% in trade, 87.15% in manufacturing, 59.9% 
in services other than trade or transportation and 83.6% in all non-agricultural activities (ILO, 
2012). Informal employment includes own-account workers working in their own informal 
enterprise, producing goods for his own or family consumption or members of informal 
producers’ cooperatives, domestic workers employed by households, casual day labour and 
temporary or part-time work for formal firms. People working as small farmers, street 
vendors, hawkers, micro-entrepreneurs, cobbler, rag-pickers, porters, labourers, artisans all 
belong to the informal sector. Traditionally, it is assumed that workers in the informal sector 
are younger, have less education and earn less than the formal labours (Thomas, 1992, 
Maloney 1999). Sometimes, workers or firms voluntarily select into the informal sector given 
their preferences and skills or, in order to avoid taxes or regulatory legislation (De Soto 1989, 
Maloney 1999, Cunningham and Maloney 2001). In general, informal wage is a market 
determined competitive wage whereas formal wage is a negotiated one. Thus, formal workers 
enjoy a higher wage premium than their informal counterparts. In case of self employment, 
however, wage of informal workers may exceed those of formal workers (Maloney 1998, 1999). This 
difference in wage may be attributed to the existence of trade union in formal sector, 
difference in skill level of the workers, immigration of workers and their nature, mobility of 
factors between the two types of sectors, liberalization policy adopted by the domestic 
economy etc as studied by different scholars (Marjit and Kar 2005; Marjit 2003, Marjit and 
Acharyya 2006, Marjit and Maiti, 2006, Mandal and Chaudhuri 2011 etc.). In most of the less 
developing countries, the public sector which employs a large number of workforces is 
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confronted with the pressure to increase wages of the existing workforce which, reduces its 
potential for hiring new workers with its budget constraints. This leads to widening wage 
differentials between the formal and residual (informal) sectors with a declining proportion of 
the urban labor force employed in the formal sector (Mazumdar, 1983). Labour segmentation 
theory suggests that there may be a wage differential between the primary and secondary 
(formal and informal) sectors even if both the sectors have equal potential (Fields 1975, 
Dickens and Lang 1985, Agenor and Montiel 1996). The higher wage of primary workers 
cannot be explained simply in terms of their higher skill and efficiency since many secondary 
workers are capable of performing well, given the opportunity to do so. Nevertheless, the 
wages of two sectors are interdependent. An increase in formal wage results into an increase 
in the wage of informal sector through reduction in rate of return to capital (Carruth and 
Oswald, 1981 and Leamer 1998)2. But, if the economy enjoys some monopoly power in 
world market, a rise in the formal wage reduces the informal wage (Carruth and Oswald, 
1981). 
International mobility of labor has significantly increased with the adoption of liberalization 
policies by the countries and it plays an important role in the determination of wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. Unskilled emigration of workers worsens 
the wage-gap, if and only if the distributive share of the intersectorally mobile factor (capital) 
of the skilled sector is greater than that of the unskilled sector. Similarly a skilled emigration 
improves wage inequality under similar condition. However, the result is completely reversed 
if the relative distributive shares of capital are opposite. skill emigration can reduce wage 
inequality, although absolute wages increase with emigration (Marjit and Kar, 2005). 
Emigration of skilled labor must reduce the wage rate of unskilled workers under certain 
                                                            
2  A rise in union or minimum wages in the formal sector cannot be passed along in higher prices. Thus, profits 
fall, leading to a migration of capital, rather than labor, out of the formal sector. Capital moves to informal 
sector driving up wages and employment in that sector. 
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factor intensity assumption. Emigration can lead to a drastic change in the degree of wage 
inequality depending on which sectors survive in the post-emigration scenario (Marjit and 
Kar, 2009). Basically, international migration of labour and its effect on wage inequality 
depends on the relative capital intensities of sectors that use either skilled or unskilled labour 
(Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri, 2007). There may be deterioration in wage inequality following an 
inflow of foreign unskilled labor (Beladi, Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi, 2008).  
As we have mentioned before, associated illegality with the undocumented nature of informal 
sector makes it vulnerable to corruption and / or extortion (Mandal, Marjit & Beladi, 2014). 
Recent literature on corruption and development focuses on such dimension quite 
extensively. Corruption as an institutional factor affects the development process of an 
economy. In the context of pervasive and cumbersome regulations in developing countries, 
corruption may actually improve efficiency and help growth. In the second best world, where 
there are pre-existing policy induced distortions, additional distortions in the form of black- 
marketing, smuggling, etc., may actually improve welfare even when some resources have to 
be spent in such activities (Bardhan, 1997). On the other side, the corrupt officials may 
actually cause administrative delays in order to attract more bribes (Gunnar Myrdal, 1968). It 
is an important determinant of the costs and benefits of informality and greater corruption is 
likely to be associated with a larger informal sector. Its effect on the wage inequality between 
the sectors depends on the loose accrued by the sectors (Mandal and Marjit, 2010). Size of 
corruptive sector may increase if the unskilled labor using formal sector is capital intensive 
compared to its informal counterpart (Mandal, 2011).  
According to the conventional wisdom, trade liberalization was expected to lower the wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled labors through an increase in price of exportables. 
The experience of East Asia in 1960s and 1970s shows that greater openness to trade tends to 
narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in developing countries. But the 
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experience of Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s was completely the opposite. 
The increase in wage inequality is explained in terms of increase in import competition from 
low-wage countries that shifted resources towards industries that use skilled labor relatively 
intensively (Leamer 1993, 1994; Wood, 1994; Hanson and Harrison 1999). Another 
explanation for the rising wage inequality in Mexico is the inflow of foreign direct investment which 
is positively correlated with the relative demand for skilled labor and accounts for a large proportion 
of the increase in the skilled labor share of total wages (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Iincrease in 
wage inequality between the skilled and unskilled workers  may also be explained in terms of 
trade in intermediate inputs. Trade in intermediate inputs will shift demand away from low-
skilled activities, while raising relative demand and wages of the high skilled workers 
(Feenstra and Hanson 2001).  Experience of Brazil shows that there is no or little relationship 
between trade and informality but in case of Columbia liberal trade policies has led to the 
expansion of informal sector (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2003). Moreover, informal employment 
has expanded substantially in the post-reform period in India (Dev, 2000).  Informal output 
and informal employment shows improvement as a result of trade liberalization in the import 
competing sector (Kar and marjit, 2009). Informal real wage in India has experienced a rising 
trend, despite the fact that, in the post-reform era fierce import competition pushed many 
erstwhile protected industries out of business and released significant amounts of capital and 
lanbour into unorganized manufacturing and service sectors (Marjit and Kar, 2009). An 
empirical study shows that the urban informal wage has increased substantially for workers 
hired under Non-Directory Manufacturing enterprises in India over the period of 1984-85 and 
2000-01 (Marjit and Kar, 2004). Trade liberalization leading to an increase in the import of 
low-skill manufacturing product intensifies wage inequality but an inflow of foreign capital 
may enhance wage equity between the skilled and unskilled labour (Chaudhuri and 
Yabuuchi, 2007). An improvement in the terms of trade for the domestic economy may result 
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into a fall of relative wage of unskilled labour (Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti, 2004). Wage 
of informal workers improves following a contraction of formal sector and consequent expansion of 
informal sector due to trade reform (Marjit, 2003; Marjit and Maiti, 2006; Marjit, Kar and Beladi, 
2007b). Sometimes, the degree of capital mobility determines the wage movement of informal 
workers (Marjit and Kar, 2007). Immigration of unskilled workers and trade reform both leads 
to a reduction in informal wage but informal output expands (Mandal and Chaudhuri, 2011).  
In this backdrop we develop a theoretical model a la Jones (1965, 1971) having both formal 
and informal sectors. The basic results we derive in this paper are: irrespective of factor 
intensity ranking both skilled and unskilled wage increase consequent upon trade 
liberalization, whereas relative wage disparity crucially hinges on factor intensity ranking. 
Therefore, the results indicate the role of factor intensity assumption in determining which 
kind of labor is going to loose much. 
     The present paper is divided into a number of sections. Section I has the introduction and 
background literature. Section II comprises the general structure of the model and its 
solutions. Section III discusses the findings and finally section IV includes the conclusion. 
Mathematical calculations are given in the appendix.    
I.  The Model and its Solution 
Consider a small open economy with three formal sectors (H, X and Z) and an informal 
sector Y. Commodity H is produced in the formal sector using skilled labor (s) and capital 
(k). Hence it is an intermediate input which is again used to produce X. X which represents 
the formal import competing commodity also requires capital (k) and labor (L) for its 
production and is itself protected by an import tariff (t). This artificially raises the price of X. 
X may be some electronic good as video games, camera or mobile phones. In our model, 
Commodity X is produced using both the unskilled and skilled labor either directly or 
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indirectly as it uses H as input. However, note that L gets an unionized wage (𝑤ഥ ) here. The 
intermediate commodity H may be a software development firm designing gaming software 
that is used in mobile phones. Z is an exportable commodity produced using skilled labour 
and land as factors. This may be a firm manufacturing organic chemicals. Sector Y is the only 
informal sector in our model using unskilled labor (L) and Land (T) as inputs. This may be 
street vendors selling vegetables. The other three sectors H, X and Z are informal sectors as 
these sectors use skilled labor that enjoys higher wage premium and are operated under 
government laws. Note that two types of labor (skilled and unskilled) work in separate 
sectors (Z and Y) using a common type of physical capital (land). Wage in the formal sector 
is set fixed by prior negotiations with the labour unions. Formal wage (𝑤ഥ) is higher than the 
informal wage (w) because labour laws allow various benefits to formal workers but not to 
the informal workers. Again, wage of skilled labor (𝑤௦) is higher than that of formal wage 
(𝑤ഥ). Thus 𝑤௦>𝑤ഥ>w. Capital is perfectly mobile between the two formal sector X and H. 
          All the factors of production are fully employed. Workers who do not find a job in the 
formal segment must move to the informal segment to survive and there is no open 
unemployment in the economy. Labour is heterogeneous and skilled workers receive a higher 
premium. The production functions are neo-classical types with constant returns to scale 
(CRS), diminishing marginal productivity for factor inputs and operate in perfectly 
competitive market. To build the system of equations (following Jones (1965), (1971), we use 
the following notations: 
𝑤ഥ                         Formal negotiated wage 
𝑤௦                       Wage of skilled labour 
w                         Informal wage 
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R                         Return to land 
t                           Exogenously imposed import tariff rate 
𝑃௛                        Price of intermediate good 
X                         Output of formal importable 
Y                         Output of informal sector 
Z                          Output of formal exportable sector 
H                          Output of intermediate commodity 
( 𝑃௛,𝑃௫,𝑃௬,Pz)        Exogenous commodity prices (small country assumption guarantees this) 
𝑆̅                           Total supply of skilled labour 
𝐿ത                           Total supply of unskilled labour 
𝑇ത                           Total supply of land 
𝐾ഥ                           Total supply of capital 
𝑎௜௝                         Input coefficients 
𝜃௜௝                         Relative share of the ith input in the total value of the jth commodity, 
𝜆௜௝                     Relative share of the ith  input in jth commodity. 
                             Where i= S, L, T, K and j= H, X, Y, Z 
‘^’                         represents percentage changes for particular variables 
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               The general equilibrium structure of the model is given by the following equations 
comprising of the competitive price equations from (1) to (4) as well as factor endowments 
and full employment conditions for each input through equations (5) to (8). 
𝑃௛ = 𝑤௦𝑎௦௛ + 𝑟𝑎௞௛ ………………………… (1) 
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡) = 𝑤ഥ𝑎௟௫ + 𝑟𝑎௞௫ + 𝑃௛𝑎௛௫ ……………. (2) 
𝑃௬ = 𝑤௟௬ + 𝑅𝑎்௬ ………………………… (3) 
𝑃௭ = 𝑤௦𝑎௦௭ + 𝑅𝑎் …………………….. (4) 
𝑎௦௭𝑍 + 𝑎௦௛𝐻 = 𝑆̅                     (5) 
𝑎௟௫𝑋 + 𝑎௟௬𝑌 =  𝐿ത                 (6) 
𝑎௞௛𝐻 + 𝑎௞௫𝑋 = 𝐾ഥ           (7) 
𝑎்௬𝑌 + 𝑎்௭𝑍 = 𝑇         (8) 
               The commodity prices are given from rest of the world. We intend to check the 
effects of tariff cut on endogenously determined factor prices and the wage gap between the 
skilled and unskilled workers who are employed in formal and informal sectors. 
                       The four price variables of the model 𝑊௦ , w, r and R are determined from the 
four price equations with exogenously given commodity prices 𝑃௛,𝑃௑ , 𝑃௒ and Pz in the 
following way. Given the formal wage of unskilled or informal worker 𝑤ഥ  and the exogenous 
price of commodity H (Ph), the rate of return to capital (r) is obtained from equation (2) in 
terms of tariff rate t. Substituting the value of r in equation (1) we  determine 𝑤௦. Using this 
value we obtain R from equation (4) and further we obtain w from equation (3). 
        Differentiating equations (1) to (4) and using the zero profit and envelope theorem we 
get the following mathematical results. These results will help us later in exploring the effects 
of trade liberalization. Detailed calculations are given in the appendix. 
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?̂? = 𝛼 ௧
መ
ఏೖೣ
< 0 as ?̂? < 0     ………… (9) where 𝛼 = ௧
ଵା௧
 
𝑤௦ෞ = (−)𝛼
௧መ
ఏೖೣ
 ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
> 0  as ?̂? < 0   …….. (10) 
𝑅෠ =  𝛼 ௧
መ
ఏೖೣ
 ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
ఏೞ೥
ఏ೅೥
 <0 as  ?̂? < 0     ………… (11) 
wෝ = (−) 𝛼 ௧
መ
ఏೖೣ
 ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
ఏೞ೥
ఏ೅೥
ఏ೅ೊ
ఏ೗ೊ
  >0 as ?̂? < 0  …….. (12) 
Wage gap between two kinds of labour is given by 
𝑤௦ෞ − 𝑤ෝ =  
ఈ௧መ
ఏೖೣ
ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
 ఏ೅೤ିఏ೅೥
ఏ೅೥ఏ೗೤
       …………….. (13) 
II.A Tariff cut and Wage Rates 
Following trade liberalization, protectionary trade policies are gradually becoming an issue of 
past. So, we strive to check various effects of tariff reduction. From equation (9) to (13) we 
find that as the tariff rate imposed on the import competing sector decreases the rate of return 
to capital (r) falls, wage of skilled labour (ws) goes up and rate of return to land (R) 
decreases. However, at the same time wage of unskilled labour (w) increases due to reduction 
in tariff rate. Thus, we may say that both the skilled and unskilled labour gain following tariff 
cut when capital is allowed to move between the two formal sectors of the economy where 
one sectors supplies an intermediate input for the second one. 
Proposition I:  A tariff cut in the formal sector increases 𝑤௦ and w irrespective of factor  
intensities. 
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Explanation:          From equation (10) and (12) it is found that 𝑤௦ෞ > 0 and 𝑤ෝ > 0 as ?̂? < 0. 
A reduction in tariff rate reduces the domestic price of commodity X. This, in turn, must 
reduce the return to the factors that are used in its production. X being a formal sector hires 
labour at a fixed unionized wage (𝑤ഥ) and the price of the intermediate input H is given 
exogenously. Thus, the effect of reduction in the domestic price of X directly falls on the rate 
of return to capital. Hence, rate of return to capita (r) falls. This capital is freely mobile 
between two formal sector X and H. From equation (1) it is also evident that the wage rate of 
skilled labor in sector H must increase to compensate the decrease in rate of return to capital 
as price of the intermediate (Ph) is given exogenously. An increase in the wage of skilled 
labour reduces the rate of return to land (see equation (4)) for a given price of Z. This will 
jack up the wage rate of informal workers (w). Thus both the skilled and unskilled labour 
gains in absolute terms due to trade reform which is marked by a reduction in tariff rate or 
protection rate. 
Proposition II:      The relative wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers depends on 
factor intensities. 
Explanation: First let us consider that Sector Y uses land more intensively than sector Z. 
This would be more realistic since Y is an informal sector. In most developing countries, the 
informal commodities are produced using unskilled (informal) labor and land. It is evident 
from equation (13) that (𝑤௦ෞ − 𝑤ෝ) < 0 if 𝜃்௬ > 𝜃்௭ since 0<𝜃்௭, 𝜃௟௬,𝜃௞௫,𝜃௦௛,𝜃௞௛<1 and ?̂? <
0. If it is the informal sector that uses land more intensively than the exportable sector then 
skilled-unskilled wage gap may decrease due to trade reform. From (11) we find that rate of 
return to land (R) decreases due to reduction in tariff rate. Since sector Y uses land more 
intensively than unskilled labour, 𝑅𝑎்௬ decreases by significant amount. To compensate this 
𝑤𝑎௟௬ must increase through increase in w. On the other hand, a decrease in R affects sector Z 
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by reducing 𝑅𝑎்௭  but this is compensated by an increase in 𝑤௦𝑎௦௓. Since sector Y uses land 
more intensively, fall in 𝑅𝑎்௬ is greater than the fall in 𝑅𝑎்௭ . Alternatively, we may say that 
rate of increase in w is more than the rate of increase in 𝑤௦. Thus, the wage gap will decrease 
given the condition that 𝜃்௬ > 𝜃்௭. If factor intensity assumption is reversed, 𝜃்௬ < 𝜃்௭, 
then the result also gets reversed. If 𝜃்௬ < 𝜃்௭, then the wage gap between the formal and 
informal labor would increase following a reduction in tariff for formal sector X. It is evident 
from equation (13) that (𝑤௦ෞ − 𝑤ෝ) > 0 if 𝜃்௬ < 𝜃்௭ since 0<𝜃்௭, 𝜃௟௬,𝜃௞௫,𝜃௦௛,𝜃௞௛<1 and ?̂? <
0. Since sector Z uses land more intensively than its other factor skilled labor, 𝑅்௓ decreases 
by significant amount. Decrease in 𝑅்௓ is compensated by increase in 𝑤௦𝑎௦௭ through 
improvement in wage of skilled labor (𝑤௦). Similarly, a reduction in rate of return to land 
reduces 𝑅𝑎்௬ which is again compensated by increase in 𝑤𝑎௟௬ through improvement in wage 
of unskilled or informal labor (w). Since, sector Z is more land intensive, decrease in 𝑅்௓ is 
more than the fall in 𝑅𝑎்௬. Thus, wage of skilled labor must increase more than the increase 
in wage of unskilled or informal labour leading to widening of the wage gap.  
II. Conclusion 
          The present paper has investigated the relationship between trade policy and the wage 
gap between the skilled and unskilled workers employed in the formal and informal sectors of 
a small open economy. We have developed a general equilibrium model to investigate this. 
The results of the model show that though the return to both the skilled and unskilled labor 
improves due to trade reform irrespective of factor intensities, the wage gap between them 
depends on the factor intensities of the commodities produced. If the informal sector uses 
land more intensively than the formal export sector then the skilled-unskilled wage gap 
decreases due to trade reform.  
APPENDIX 
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A reduction in the tariff rate and the consequent equations of change are given below. 
𝑑𝑃௫
𝑃௫
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+ 
𝑑𝑡
𝑡
𝑡𝑃௫
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
=  
𝑑𝑤ഥ
𝑤ഥ
𝑎௅௫𝑤ഥ
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+  
𝑑𝑎௅௫
𝑎௅௫
𝑎௅௫𝑤ഥ
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+
𝑑𝑟
𝑟
𝑎௞௫ 𝑟
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+
𝑑𝑎௞௫
𝑎௞௫
 
𝑟𝑎௞௫
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+ 
𝑑𝑃௛
𝑑𝑃௛
𝑎௛௫𝑃௛
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+  
𝑑𝑎௛௫
𝑎௛௫
𝑃௛𝑎௛௫
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
 
Since 𝑤ഥ  and 𝑃௫ do not change, 𝑃௛ is given exogenously and using the envelope condition the 
above expression yields: 
?̂?𝜃௞௫ =  𝛼?̂?, where 𝛼 =  
௧
(ଵା௧)
and 𝜃௞௫ =  
௔ೖೣ௉ೣ
௉ೣ (ଵା௧)
 , the income share of capital in sector X. 
Thus,  
?̂? = 𝛼 ௧
መ
ఏೖೣ
< 0 as ?̂? < 0     ………… (9) where 𝛼 = ௧
ଵା௧
                                            (9) 
Now differentiating equation (1) and substituting the expression for ?̂? we get, 
𝑤௦ෞ = (−)𝛼
௧መ
ఏೖೣ
 ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
> 0  as ?̂? < 0   …….. (10) 
Again, using equation (4) and substituting the above information, we obtain 
𝑅෠ =  𝛼 ௧
መ
ఏೖೣ
 ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
ఏೞ೥
ఏ೅೥
 <0 as  ?̂? < 0     ………… (11) 
Differentiating equation (3) and substituting the above results yields: 
wෝ = (−) 𝛼 ௧
መ
ఏೖೣ
 ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
ఏೞ೥
ఏ೅೥
ఏ೅ೊ
ఏ೗ೊ
  >0 as ?̂? < 0  …….. (12) 
Equation (10) and (12) show that both the wages of skilled and unskilled labor increases. The 
expression for wage gap (𝑤௦ෞ − 𝑤ෝ) is derived by substituting the values of 𝑤௦ෞ and 𝑤ෝ  from 
equation (10) and (12) respectively. 
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The wage gap is given by  
𝑤௦ෞ − 𝑤ෝ =  
ఈ௧መ
ఏೖೣ
ఏೖ೓
ఏೞ೓
 ఏ೅೤ିఏ೅೥
ఏ೅೥ఏ೗೤
       …………….. (13) 
Now the absolute value of wage gap depends on 𝜃்௬ and 𝜃்௭. 
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